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Abstract 
 The going private decision is less examined in the corporate finance 
literature compared to the IPO topic, although it is of similar importance in a 
company’s life. This paper surveys previous theoretical and empirical studies 
discussing the going private decision. Deeper insights are provided about 
reasons which motivate companies to leave the public capital market. The 
role of regulatory changes like the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 
and their implications for the decision making process of US listed 
companies concerning staying public or going private are addressed. A 
literature synopsis is provided about different aspects within the delisting 
topic. Literature about abnormal returns during the announcement of a going 
private transaction, bid premiums paid to investors as well as characteristics 
of companies which typically decide for privacy is reviewed. The current 
stage of research is analyzed in order to develop further relevant exploration 
areas within the going private topic. This paper also explains investors’ 
incentives. A precise recognition of potential going private companies on the 
public capital market allows shareholders to collect not only abnormal 
returns, but also bid premiums and enable them to increase their earnings 
within a short period of time. Additionally, also companies profit from 
knowledge about going privates. Being aware of the large costs, they can 
avoid unnecessary expenses of their public-to-private-and-back cycles. 
 
Keywords: Going private, delisting, public and private lifecycle 
 
Introduction 
 A public company might decide to leave the public capital market 
during its lifecycle. Since the 1960s corporate lifecycle models have been 
applied in the literature (Owen and Yawson, 2010). Models of Greiner 
(1972), Adizes (1979) or Miller and Friesen (1984) have been widely used. 
Miller and Friesen (1984) e.g. divide a firm’s life into five stages and 
distinguish between the birth, growth, maturity, revival and decline stage. 
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Based on their empirical research the firms in different stages vary in 
structure, strategy and decision making. According to Jain and Kini (1999), 
who focused their research on initial public offerings (IPO) within the 
lifecycle context, IPO represents the first significant stage in the evolution of 
company’s public life. The going public step occurs during the growth phase 
of a company and allows private firms with growth prospects to finance their 
investments. 
 Maug (2001) explains the IPO decision within the lifecycle context as 
a decision of the optimal ownership structure. According to him, as the 
ownership structure changes over the lifecycle of a firm, insiders decide for a 
going public step when they lost their comparative advantage in gathering 
information about firm’s growth prospects over firm’s outsiders. Other 
reasons for a going public step have been analyzed by Shah and Thakor 
(1988) or Pagano (1993) who see advantages in diversification of risk, when 
companies decide for a public life. Pagano et al. (1998) argue with reduced 
overmonitoring and e.g. Zingales (1995) argues with a higher valuation of a 
company after the public step. Overall, a lot of research has been conducted 
about the going public step of companies. 
 According to Gompers (1995), after becoming public, firms have to 
choose for each stage of their lifecycle if they remain public or go private. 
Gill and Walz (2012) found out that firms which decide to go private were 
younger at the time of their IPO16. The query of Luetolf and Neumann 
(2004) about the reasons which account for the going private decision 
enclosed the high regulation and transparency standards as the main motive 
for such a step. 
 Despite its importance in the lifecycle of a firm, the decision to leave 
the public capital market is less studied in the literature in contrary to the 
research about the going public decision. According to Djama et al. (2012) 
conditions under which a public firm exits the public market as well as its 
rationales for this move need to be examined. They call voluntary delistings 
“going private transactions” and focus their analysis on incentives and 
financial characteristics of these firms. But the step into privacy is not 
always a voluntary one. Due to poor performance or violation of listing 
requirements, firms are often forced to leave the public capital market17. 
 Being public means having access to capital. Consequently, a 
company which is publicly traded should be liquid and fairly valued. If a 
company is able to finance its further growth with own cash flows18 or a 
                                                          
16 Going private firms with a mean of 11.63 years (median: 7 years) compared to the control 
group with a mean of 18.89 years (median: 9 years). 
17 Nasdaq boot 85 companies and NYSE 54 companies for failing to meet stock exchange 
requirements in 2008 (Plourd, 2009). 
18 Free Cash Flow Hypothesis by Jensen (1986). 
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large shareholder is willing to provide funds, then public capital sourcing 
might become too expensive. Combined with e.g. undervaluation19 through 
the market or low share liquidity20, incentives for a step into privacy might 
increase. 
 When observing all public to private transactions on the US market 
without distinguishing their specific incentives, a first era during 1980s and a 
second one during the 2000s can be recognized. In the first era mostly 
depressed companies were taken private in order to increase their 
profitability. In the new era companies rather tried to avoid the short term 
pressure of pubic capital markets as well as the costs of being public. 
(Schneider and Valenti, 2010) 
 The passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) in 2002 in the US 
increased additionally cost of being public and is seen as an additional 
driving factor for the going private decision21. The increased disclosure and 
corporate governance requirements made firms questioning their value of 
remaining public. The study by Marosi and Massoud (2007) showed 
increasing number of firms deregistering from the public capital market in 
the post-SOA era. The firms were mostly characterized by undervaluation 
and low growth opportunities. The costs and burdens after the adoption of 
SOA affected particularly firms of smaller size measured by market 
capitalization. Leuz et al. (2007) as well as Becker and Pollet (2008) could 
empirically prove their size hypothesis. 
 The aim of this paper is to provide insights about the going private 
phenomenon. A survey of both, theoretical and empirical literature is given 
in order to highlight different reasons and motives of firms for their step into 
privacy. A further objective is to review studies which examined the 
characteristics of firms which decide to leave the public capital market and to 
provide a synthesis of the current stage of research. Lastly, impact on 
investors by going private transactions is highlighted. 
 This literature survey is organized as follows. Firstly, an extensive 
analysis of previous studies is provided. It focuses foremost on motives of 
going private decisions. Then, a large amount of empirical findings from 
previous going private transactions is presented. Besides findings about 
characteristics of going private companies, findings about premiums paid to 
investors at going private transactions are summarized. Secondly, insights 
and implications from the examined previous studies are given. The paper 
results in a synthesis of the literature with respect to information needed by 
investors. 
                                                          
19 Kim and Lyn (1991). 
20 Boot et al. (2008). 
21 E.g. Marosi and Massoud (2007) or Leuz at al. (2007). 
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Literature survey 
Analysis of previous studies 
 DeAngelo et al. (1984) provide one of the first definitions of going 
private. But due to their research focusing on MBOs, their definition is not 
widely applicable as it describes going privates as a replacing of all public 
shareholders by the management group. 
 There are diverse recent definitions of going private which can be 
found in the literature. So do Ernst and Haecker (2007) define a going 
private as a decision of a company not to participate at the public capital 
market any more. When it comes to acquisitions, they subsume into their 
definition just those transactions as a going private, where a public company 
was acquired by a private company. A very similar definition is presented by 
Burghof and Schilling (2003), who require that the acquirer must strictly be a 
private company.  
 A broader definition of going private is used by Richard and 
Weinheimer (2002) who define going privates as all transactions which 
transfer a publicly traded company into a private company, and which still 
can be traded on non-public markets22. Their going private definition 
includes also a transfer of company divisions, which are taken out of the 
concern. 
 Beck and Stinn (2002) define a going private as a transaction in 
which a publicly traded company is transferred into a private one and not 
traded on any capital market any more. The equity capital is transferred to 
one or to a limited number of shareholders. Further, an acquisition or a 
merger with a public company is not seen as a going private. The delisting 
has to be voluntary and not enforced by failure or liquidation. This definition 
of going private is also used in the studies of Eisele et al. (2003) or Moehrle 
(2006). 
  
Motives of going private decisions 
 A decision between going private or staying public is a complex one, 
because mostly not one but a combination of factors leads to the final step. 
 
Traditional considerations 
Agency considerations 
 Based on the Agency Theory (Jensen and Meckling (1976)), Jensen 
(1986) developed the FCF hypothesis, which he sees as a possible 
explanation for the going private decision of companies. Free cash flow is 
defined as the cash flow, which remains, after having financed all investment 
projects with a positive net present value and for which there is no current 
                                                          
22 OTC. 
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use in the company and therefore managers further control it. This made the 
free cash flow problem to an agency problem as the principals and the agents 
have mostly different ideas for the usage of it. Jensen (1986) explains that 
the management may e.g. want to keep the control about the free cash flow, 
seeing it as a resource and lead therefore to an inefficient usage of it. In 
contrary, principals would wish to profit from the free cash flow paid out as 
dividends. 
 Principals see in a going private step the possibility to decrease the 
agency costs, which have occurred due to different interests of principals and 
agents. 
  
Liquidity considerations 
 Being public is according to Zingales (1995) only beneficial for 
companies, if their market price and therefore their value, established at the 
IPO, holds. As trading on stock exchanges is cheaper than bilateral trades, it 
is the increasing trading volume, which is providing liquidity. Amihud and 
Mendelson (1988) showed in their research the importance of liquidity for 
public firms. Lower liquidity might increase the cost of capital on the public 
market for such companies, following the theory of Modigliani and Miller 
(1963), who showed that the lower cost of capital the market is offering, the 
greater the incentive of companies to be publicly traded. When appropriate 
liquidity is not given any more, companies may decide for a step into 
privacy. 
 
Ownership considerations 
 Companies with a low free float are considered to be a special case 
when the reasons for a going private are discussed. According to 
Schwichtenberg (2003), companies with a major shareholder are very often 
affected by low share liquidity and undervaluation. Often, the major 
shareholder wishes higher freedom when taking decisions or wishes to profit 
more. With his large stake, a going private step is easier as not many shares 
are in the free float. 
 
Undervaluation considerations 
 Due to e.g. less lucrative industry, public companies might have a 
poor stock price performance and be therefore undervalued. Suffering under 
a low market valuation, forces companies into privacy, even if the 
performance of the company is good, often even better than the one of the 
competitors (Mehran and Peristiani, 2010). The development of the market-
to-book ratio is a possible factor, which might be observed in order to 
recognize undervaluation on the public capital market. 
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Modern considerations 
Visibility considerations 
 Ernst and Haecker (2007) advance a view that small companies are 
not getting enough attention from the investors on the public market and 
therefore being public has no sense for them. They also add that bigger 
companies with a low free float are affected by a scant attention as well. The 
visibility hypothesis of Mehran and Peristiani (2010) which also corresponds 
with the opinion of Bharath and Dittmar (2010) states that low analyst 
coverage and low institutional ownership lead to low share liquidity and 
make a company invisible. According to Modigliani and Miller (1963), low 
cost of capital increases the wish to become public. As the reverse must be 
also truth, low liquidity, which occurred due to low visibility makes a staying 
public too expensive. 
 
Growth considerations 
 It is the growth stage of a company’s lifecycle when it might decide 
for a step into the public capital market. Companies in this stage have 
according to Kim and Weisbach (2005) large opportunities for investments 
and only a limited access to other financing alternatives due to high leverage, 
so they decide to go public. Based on this finding, it can be concluded that 
firms in a later lifecycle stage (maturity) with less growth and less 
investment opportunities may decide for a going private step with a higher 
probability. 
 
Takeover considerations 
 Grupp (1995) states another important reason for a going private 
decision. Being a public company with a high free float makes it possible to 
become a victim of an unfriendly takeover. If it is such a case, companies, in 
order to protect themselves, decide often for a going private step with the 
aim to preserve their independence. 
 
Considerations related to SOA 
Cost of being public considerations 
 Raffel (2003) discusses a further reason for a going private decision. 
For him, investor and public relations costs as well as other costs connected 
with the being public are mostly so high, that it makes no sense for a 
company to stay public. Schwichtenberg (2003) adds that mainly small size 
companies are affected by these high costs. Additionally, the passage of 
SOA increased those costs on the US market significantly (Leuz, 2007). 
 
Findings in empirical studies 
 Findings about abnormal returns and premiums paid 
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 It were DeAngelo et al. (1984) and Denis (1992) who conducted the 
most important studies analyzing the returns after a going private 
announcement on the US capital market. DeAngelo et al. (1984) were 
analyzing 72 going private transaction between 1973 and 1980 and observed 
an abnormal return of 22.27%. In their study they also examined the contrary 
step, when a company announced that a going private decision was taken 
back. In such a case, DeAngelo et al. (1984) could observe a negative 
abnormal return of -8.88%. Denis (1992) was observing 192 transactions 
between the years 1980 and 1987. He found an abnormal return of 12.01%. 
 Lehn and Poulsen (1989) could observe an abnormal return of 
16.30% between the years 1983 and 1986. Easterwood et al. (1994) 
conducted a study with 184 going private companies during ten years and 
observed an abnormal return of 16.10%. They calculated also the cumulated 
abnormal returns and differed between going private announcements with 
just one or multiple bidders. In the first case they could observe a CAR of 
26.1% and in the second case one of 43.7%. Another large study is from 
Carow and Roden (1997) who examined 88 companies and showed an 
abnormal return of 17%. The following tables present the most important 
studies about observed abnormal returns after the announcement of a going 
private transaction at different public capital markets. 
 Table 3: Literature synopsis on AAR 
 
  
Publication year Author(s) Observation period Transactions AAR Country
1984 DeAngelo et al. 1973-1980 72 22.3% US
1987 Maupin 1972-1984 97 21.8% US
1987 Torabzadeh & Bertin 1982-1985 48 18.6% US
1988 Lehn & Poulsen 1980-1984 92 13.9% US
1989 Amihud 1983-1986 15 19.6% US
1989 Lehn & Poulsen 1980-1987 244 16.3% US
1989 Marais et al. 1974-1985 80 13.0% US
1991 Solvin et al. 1980-1988 128 17.4% US
1992 Denis 1980-1987 192 12.0% US
1992 Frankfurter & Gunay 1979-1984 110 17.2% US
1992 Lee 1973-1989 118 14.9% US
1992 Lee et al. 1983-19898 58 10.4% US
1993 Torabzadeh & Bertin 1982-1987 43 18.1% US
1993 Travlos & Bertin 1975-1983 56 16.2% US
1997 Carow & Roden 1981-1990 88 17.0% US
1997 MacKinlay 1991-1995 37 18.6% US
2006 Eisele & Walter 1995-2002 37 13.7% DE
2007 Andres et al. 1997-2005 115 12.8% EU
2007 Renneboog et al. 1997-2003 177 22.7% UK
2009 Altintig et al. 1989-1998 29 1.2% TR
2011 Geranio & Zanotti 2005-2006 106 6.1% EU
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Table 4: Literature synopsis on CAR 
 
 
 Some researchers were analyzing the premiums mostly on the US 
market. Often the higher the stake of a shareholder, the higher the premium 
paid. This fact is often impossible to proof empirically, because the exact 
premium is almost ever confidential. In contrary, the average premium paid 
to shareholders can be calculated. 
 The first study examining premiums was conducted by DeAngelo et 
al. (1984). Their observation of 57 completed transactions showed a 
premium of 56.3%. The findings of Amihud (1989) comparing to the results 
of DeAngelo et al. (1984) are lower, with a calculated premium of 31.1%. A 
synopsis of studies about the bid premiums is provided in table below. 
Table 3: Literature synopsis on bid premiums 
 
 
 
 
Publication year Author(s) Observation period Transactions CAR Window
1984 DeAngelo et al. 1973-1980 72 28.5% [-40/+40]
1987 Torabzadeh & Bertin 1982-1985 48 23.3% [-330/+120]
1988 Lehn & Poulsen 1980-1984 92 20.1% [-20/+20]
1989 Kaplan 1980-1986 25 42.3% [-60/*]
1989 Lehn & Poulsen 1980-1987 244 20.5% [-20/+20]
1992 Denis 1980-1987 192 22.3% [-40/+40]
1993 Torabzadeh & Bertin 1982-1987 43 22.6% [-360/+60]
1993 Travlos & Cornett 1975-1983 56 17.6% [-15/+15]
1993 Warga & Welch 1985-1989 16 36.3% [-30/+60]
1994 Easterwood et al. 1978-1988 184 26.1% [-20/0]
1997 Carow & Roden 1981-1990 88 23.2% [-20/*]
2006 Eisele & Walter 1995-2002 37 24.8% [-20/+20]
2007 Andres et al. 1997-2005 115 24.2% [-30/+30]
2007 Renneboog et al. 1997-2003 177 27.4% [-40/+40]
2010 Baran & King 1981-2006 182 21.5% [-30/+30]
2010 Billett et al. 1980-1990 195 28.7% [-60/+3]
2011 Geranio & Zanotti 2000-2005 106 18.8% [-30/+30]
Publication year Author(s) Observation period Transactions Market Bid premium Window
1984 DeAngelo et al. 1973-1980 57 US 56.3% 40
1985 Lowenstein 1979-1984 28 US 56.0% 30
1988 Lehn & Poulsen 1980-1984 72 US 41.0% 20
1989 Amihud 1983-1986 15 US 31.1% 20
1989 Kaplan 1980-1986 76 US 42.3% 60
1989 Lehn & Poulsen 1980-1987 257 US 36.1% 20
1993 Harlow & Howe 1980-1989 121 US 44.9% 20
1993 Kaplan & Stein 1980-1989 124 US 43.0% 40
1993 Travlos & Cornett 1975-1983 56 US 41.9% 30
1997 Carow & Roden 1981-1990 88 US 46.4% 20
2005 Weir et al. 1998-2000 95 UK 44.9% 30
2007 Renneboog et al. 1997-2003 177 UK 41.0% 20
2011 Geranio & Zanotti 2000-2005 106 EU 21.2% 30
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Findings about firm characteristics 
 The gain of abnormal returns and bid premiums on going private 
transactions is lucrative for investors. Having recognized this fact, it became 
relevant for investors to identify potential going private companies on the 
public capital market and to purchase their shares in order to take advantage 
of those possible gains. Researchers started to focus on studies which would 
characterize typical going private companies and distinguishing them from 
those, which are staying public. A more accurate characterization increases 
the probability of a correct prediction and is therefore worthwhile for 
investors. 
 The first study with the aim to characterize going private companies 
was conducted by Maupin et al. (1984) for the US market. The authors were 
examining cash flow ratios, P/B ratio, the dividend yield as well as the 
concentration of ownership. All tested factors in their study had a significant 
influence on the going private decision. The relationship was proved to be 
positive between all factors tested with the only exception of the P/B ratio. 
The results showed that this relationship is negative; the lower the P/B ratio 
the higher the probability of a going private. This study was repeated by 
Maupin (1987) and extended by two factors, P/E ratio and the book to initial 
cost of assets ratio. The results showed that the retested factors of the 
previous study as well as the two new factors had all a significant influence 
on the going private decision. 
 A large and relevant study was conducted by Lehn and Poulsen 
(1989). Their study was based on the free cash flow (FCF) hypothesis of 
Jensen (1986), which expects companies with large FCF compared to equity 
to go private. Also included in their study were the factors equity, tax 
payments and sales growth. The FCF hypothesis of Jensen (1986) could be 
proven by Lehn and Poulsen (1989). At the same time another large study 
about going privates was conducted by Kieschnick (1989). Also his study 
was focused on the US market and the factors he examined were e.g. interest 
expense, growth, FCF or management ownership. His findings were contrary 
to those of Lehn and Poulsen (1989) as Kieschnick (1989) could not find any 
evidence for the FCF hypothesis of Jensen (1986). 
 A study focusing on the ownership structure was conducted by 
Lowenstein (1986). In his paper, Lowenstein (1986) examined only MBOs, 
as his hypothesis was that companies leaving the public capital market as an 
MBO are having larger stakes in manager hands. He found evidence for this 
hypothesis and also showed that companies leaving the public capital market 
and significantly smaller than those which do not decide for such a step. 
 Loh (1992) focused his study on financial characteristics as possible 
factors to distinguish from staying public companies. Among others he tested 
the profitability of the company, its capital structure, the turnover and FCF. 
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He could confirm the findings of Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and found 
evidence for the FCF hypothesis. Other factors were not significant for the 
going private decision. Another study which was examining the FCF 
hypothesis focused only on LBOs and was conducted by Opler and Titman 
(1993). The authors could proof that the hypothesis holds by testing Tobin’s 
Q and the FCF level. Companies with a low Tobin’s Q and relatively high 
cash flow, characterized by authors as those with unfavorable investment 
opportunities, are more likely to leave the public capital market. 
 The FCF hypothesis formulated by Jensen (1986) remained the base 
for almost all studies also in the nineties. Carow and Roden (1997) found 
also support for this hypothesis in their paper, testing the high level of FCF, 
the low Tobin’s Q23, but the focus of their study was on stock price reactions 
as already presented in the previous subchapter. Not only the FCF topic, but 
also some of the researchers remained stable and examined the going private 
phenomenon in various studies. Such an example is Kieschnick (1998) who 
conducted his second own study nine years after the first one. In his second 
study, he is using the data sample of Lehn and Poulsen (1989), but changing 
their sampling scheme. His new study supports the findings of his first study 
and rejects the findings of Lehn and Poulsen (1989). Kieschnick (1998) 
couldn’t find any evidence for neither the growth rate nor the level of FCF as 
significant factors influencing the going private decision. No evidence was 
found also for the size of the company and the tax payments. 
 Kieschnick was also a co-author in a study examining another large 
sample of companies going from public to private. It was the study of 
Halpern et al. (1999), in which a large amount of possible characteristics of 
going private companies was again tested. Consistent with previous findings 
of Kieschnick (1989 & 1998), no evidence was found for the level of FCF. 
Significant evidence however was showed for investment expenditures, 
stock performance and managerial stock ownership. The statistical evidence 
for the last factor is consistent with findings of Lowenstein (1986).  
 The following table presents a synopsis of studies examining 
characteristics of companies which went private. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 Tobin (1969). 
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Table 4: Literature synopsis on characteristics 
 
Year Author(s) Observation pTransactions Market Tested factors Main findings
1984 Maupin et al. 1972-1983 63 US - Ownership
- CF ratios
- P/B ratio
- Dividend yield
1986 Lowenstein 1979-1984 28 US - Size
- Ownership of management
1987 Maupin 1972-1984 54 US - Ownership
- CF ratios
- P/E ratio
- P/B ratio
- Book value of assets to original costs
- Dividend yield
1989 Kieschnick 1981-1986 102 US - FCF (Jensen, 1986)
- Ownership of management
- Growth expectations
- Interest expense
- Depreciation expense
1989 Lehn & Poulsen 1980-1987 244 US - FCF (Jensen, 1986)
- Size (equity)
- CF/equity
- Sales growth
- Tax expense
1992 Loh 1986-1988 45 US - FCF (Jensen, 1986)
- Liquidity ratio
- Profitability ratio
- Turnover
- Capital structure
1993 Opler & Titman 1980-1990 180 US - FCF (Jensen, 1986)
- R&D expenses
- Diversification
- Tobin's Q
- Liquidity
- Operating income / assets
1994 Servaes 1987-1992 99 US - Capital expenditures - No evidence for higher capital 
expenditures.
1998 Kieschnick 1980-1987 244 US - FCF (Jensen, 1986)
- Size (equity)
- CF/equity
- Sales growth
- Tax expense
1999 Halpern et al. 1981-1986 126 US - FCF (Jensen, 1986)
- Tax expense
- Ownership of management
- Stock performance
- Investment expenditures
2002 Beck & Stinn 1995-2000 22 DE - FCF (Jensen, 1986)
- Stock performance
- Free float
- Size
- Growth expectations
- P/E ratio
- P/B ratio
- Ownership structure
2002 Kosedag & Lane 1980-1996 21 US - FCF (Jensen, 1986)
- Tax expense
- Sales growth
2005 Evans et al. 1990-1999 80 AUS - FCF (Jensen, 1986)
- Growth
- Leverage
- Liquidity
- R&D expense
- Ownership of management
- Loh confirmed findings of Lehn & 
Poulsen (1989).
- All factors have a positive significant 
influence on the going private decision 
apart of P/B ratio, which has a negative 
one.
- Evidence for both factors was proven.
- Same findings like in Maupin et al. 
(1984) were shown by Maupin (1987).
- P/E ratio and the book values of 
assets to original costs had also a 
significant influence.
- Kieschnick was the first researcher 
who rejected the FCF hypothesis of 
Jensen (1986).
- Evidence for the FCF hypothesis was 
found.
- Also CF/equity is a significant factor, 
for all others no evidence was found.
- Evidence for Jensen's hypothesis was 
found.
- No evidence was found for R&D costs, 
representing financial distress costs.
- Also in his second study, where 
Kieschnick used the database of Lehn & 
Poulsen (1989), the FCF hypothesis had 
to be rejected.
- FCF hypothesis had to be rejected.
- Investment expenditures, stock 
performance and managerial 
ownership had singnificant incfluence 
on the decision.
- Growth expectations, percentage of 
free float, P/E ratio and the ownership 
structure measured in number of 
shareholders have negatively 
correlated with the going private 
decision.
- No evidence for FCF hypothesis was 
found.
- Tax expense measured as tax savings 
was significant.
- In Australia the FCF hypothesis of 
Jensen had to be rejected.
- Further, the companies have high 
liquidity, low growth rates and low 
R&D expenses.
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Other relevant findings 
 The passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) in 2002 increased 
accounting standards for US publicly listed companies. As staying public 
became even more expensive, some companies decided to leave the market. 
Engel et al. (2007) connected in their study the two topics SOA and the 
going private decision. They were analyzing US companies between the 
years 1998 and 2005. Their focus was on the frequency of such transactions 
after the passage of SOA. Their empirical analysis showed that the frequency 
of going private transactions clearly increased after SOA. Gleason et al. 
(2007) were analyzing different reasons which might motivate companies to 
go private. To analyze the higher cost of being public as a possible 
motivation, they divided their sample of firms into two groups which went 
private prior and following to SOA. They results show, that the major 
motivation for companies which went private after the passage of SOA were 
clearly the higher cost of being public in contrary to other reasons which 
were dominant prior to SOA. 
 Only few studies focused on the entire public lifecycle when they 
were explaining the going private decision. The study of Mehran and 
Peristiani (2010) focuses on the visibility aspect of companies which decide 
to go private despite being solid competitors to their peers. They adapt the 
entire public life view and examine with an extended, dynamic hazard model 
three visibility aspects, analyst coverage, institutional ownership and stock 
turnover as possible factors explaining the going private decision over the 
company’s public life. Their results show, that firms with declining analyst 
coverage, falling institutional ownership as well as low stock turnover go 
more likely private and decide for such a step sooner. A study focusing on 
costs and benefits of being public as reasons for delisting was conducted by 
Bharath and Dittmar (2010). Similarly to Mehran and Peristiani (2010), they 
observe a company during its whole public life and identify e.g. low analyst 
coverage and low institutional ownership as reasons influencing the going 
private decision. 
 
 
 
Year Author(s) Observation pTransactions Market Tested factors Main findings
2007 Gleason et al. 1998-2003 221 US - Size
- Growth expectations
- Profitability
- Leverage
- Earnings predictability
- Liquidity
- Financial distress costs
2008 Boot et al. 1999-2004 154 US - Stock performance
- Stock liquidity
- Public market investor participation
- Firms going private are smaller, with 
higher liquidity, more leverage, lower 
profitability and high growth 
expectations. The last finding was 
surprising.
- Lower stock price performance and its 
high volatility is more likely to go 
private.
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Insights and implications from previous research 
 Various factors play a role when it comes to the decision whether to 
leave the public capital market or not. The current state of research offers 
stakeholders a large amount of explanations of this phenomenon, but still a 
lot concerning this step stays unexplored. 
 
Synthesis and future trend 
 Companies which are leaving the public capital market can be 
divided into two main groups, those which are going private voluntary and 
those which are forced to leave the public capital market, because they are 
not fulfilling the listing requirements. Empirical research presented above 
mostly focused on companies which left voluntarily. When a company is not 
in a financial distress and its expectations about the own condition after the 
going private step are optimistic (e.g. reduction of agency costs24), then an 
increase in value of the company can be expected. 
 Burnett (2012) point out that companies which decide for a voluntary 
step into privacy mostly focus on long-term goals. The going private 
decision is so, among others, explained through avoidance of the short-term 
orientation of public capital markets. So may even companies with a strong 
stock price performance decide to leave voluntary. Additionally, reporting 
requirements as well as arising registration and compliance fees at the stock 
exchange increase the motivation to leave the market. Empirical studies 
focusing on the influence of SOA25 have proven a post-SOA boom of going 
private transactions. 
 A solid amount of studies exists about the characteristics of going 
private companies shortly before they announce their decision to leave the 
public capital market. Further studies exist about abnormal returns which can 
be observed during the announcement of a going private. Researchers were 
also examining premiums paid to investors. In many cases, largest 
shareholders receive even a higher premium which is not made public and 
therefore no empirical evidence exists. 
 Characteristics of going private companies which have often been 
proven having a significant influence on the decision to leave the public 
capital market are summarized in the below table: 
  
                                                          
24 Jensen (1986). 
25 See subchapter A.2.3. 
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Table 5: Typical characteristics of going private companies 
Company Share Ownership Industry 
Small size 
e.g. Gleason et al. 
(2007) 
Low stock price 
(undervaluation) 
e.g. Boot et al. (2008) 
Major shareholder 
e.g. Schwichtenberg 
(2003) 
Low industry hotness 
e.g. Mehran and 
Peristiani (2010) 
High FCF 
e.g. Lehn and Poulsen 
(1989) 
Low free float 
e.g. Beck and Stinn 
(2002) 
Low institutional 
ownership 
e.g. Bharath and 
Dittmar (2010) 
Low growth 
opportunities 
e.g. Gleason et al. 
(2007) 
Low Tobin’s Q 
e.g. Carow and 
Roden (1997) 
Low share liquidity 
e.g. Amihud and 
Mendelson (1988) 
High leverage 
e.g. Gleason et al. 
(2007) 
 
 High stock price 
volatility 
e.g. Boot et al. (2008) 
  
 Low analyst coverage 
e.g. Bharath and 
Dittmar (2010) 
  
 
The probability of a going private transaction arises when the significant 
factors increase. The following four diagrams show exemplary how the 
going private probability can be understood: 
 
 
 Following key findings could be derived from previous going private 
literature: 
Table 6: Key findings on going privates 
Going private and market behavior  
Findings: 
 
 
Comments: 
After the announcement abnormal returns rise and 
bid premiums are offered to shareholders. 
 
Empirical research could partly explain the 
magnitude of abnormal returns and bid premiums. 
They are both positive in the majority of cases and 
can be earned by shareholders. 
Going private and motives  
Findings: 
 
 
 
Comments: 
Traditional motives like high free cash flow, 
modern motives like low analyst coverage as well 
as regulatory ones (SOA) might lead to a going 
private decision. 
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It is not only one reason, but a combination of 
different motives which increases the probability of 
a step into privacy. 
 
Going private and company  
Findings: 
 
 
Comments: 
Financial characteristics of a firm are possible 
explanatory variables of its going private decision. 
 
Small size measured by market capitalization, high 
free cash flow and low Tobin’s Q have often been 
successfully tested as factors significantly 
explaining the going private decision. 
Going private and shares  
Findings: 
 
 
Comments: 
The value and the trading volume of firms’ shares 
have an influence of the going private decision. 
 
Low free flow, low share liquidity, high price 
volatility and low stock performance 
(undervaluation) increase the probability of a going 
private. 
Going private and ownership  
Findings: 
 
 
Comments: 
Ownership structure might accelerate and simplify 
a going private decision. 
 
Low institutional ownership and thus a large 
amount of noise traders might increase the wish for 
privacy. An existence of a major shareholder might 
ease the step. 
Going private and industry  
Findings: 
 
 
Comments: 
The industry in which a company is operating 
might influence the going private probability. 
 
Unattractive industry might be less appreciated by 
investors and lead to undervaluation. Additionally, 
some industries may offer low growth opportunities 
for companies (e.g. due to technological limits). 
 
 Some recent studies about going privates adapted their focus 
compared to the traditional ones which have been conducted mostly in the 
80s and 90s. So have e.g. Mehran and Peristiani (2010) explained the going 
private step in a new aspect, seeing the main reason in the visibility of 
companies. They were not only arguing with the small market capitalization 
of the company, but also with low interest of investors, who just simply do 
not see the company, because it is e.g. insufficiently covered by analysts. 
Future research should therefore focus on visibility from diverse perspectives 
as it might lead to a better explanation of the going private phenomenon. 
 As there is not one main specific reason why a company decides to 
voluntarily leave the public capital market, measures are necessary in order 
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to expand these decisions. As far as a statistical analysis allows, reasons for 
such a decision might be examined using moderating factors. Moderator 
variables affect and alter the effect of an independent variable on a 
dependent variable. Including moderator variables would hence increase the 
chance to explain the combination of reasons which lead to a going private 
decision. 
 Further research is also needed within the lifecycle context. Just a few 
studies26 examine the characteristics of going private companies during their 
whole public lifecycle and not only at the time of the announcement of the 
going private decision. Characterization of companies only shortly before the 
time of the announcement of the going private intention decreases the chance 
to find explanations for such a step and therefore decreases the chance for 
investors to recognize such companies the earliest possible. Including the 
whole public lifecycle27 into the analysis would allow a more precise 
definition of companies which typically go private. Then, not only could the 
time shortly before the announcement, but also company’s situation already 
at the time of the IPO as well as financial results and other information from 
the whole public life become part of the analysis. 
 SOA and other regulations have impact on the decision to leave the 
public capital market. The research concerning their impact might be also 
extended within the lifecycle context. This research focus would e.g. allow 
seeing characteristics of companies which are mostly affected through such 
regulations. 
 There is also a lack of satisfactory explanations about the impact of 
private equity on the going private decision. This might be firstly due to the 
fact that only few data is available about private equity investments and 
secondly because this form of financing occurred mostly during the very last 
years. 
 Extensions of going private research could also include aspects of 
behavioral finance. It might be especially the investor sentiment28, driven by 
small investors, which could lead to new findings about the going private 
phenomenon. Public companies with no or few institutional investors are 
exposed to noise traders who don’t act rationally and their buy or sell 
decisions are not based on fundamental or technical data. This uncertainty 
component might become too exhausting for some companies and 
consequently they might decide to delist. 
                                                          
26 E.g. Mehran and Peristiani (2010). 
27 Due to data availability only the public lifecycle can be examined. Even more precise 
results might be expected if the whole company lifecycle, private and public, could be 
examined. 
28 Introduced by Lee et al. (1992). 
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 Next to delisting reasons and to companies’ characteristics, other 
fields within the going private topic might also expand the scope of research. 
Especially legal issues and different techniques how to take a company 
private in different countries is of high relevance for practitioners. 
 Future going private transactions will bring more evidence and clarity 
and allow investors to understand them better. This because with an 
increasing number of going private cases in the future, a more precise 
statistical differentiation of companies will be possible. Thus, a quantitative 
analysis of transactions within one industry will allow drawing additional 
conclusions about the going private phenomenon. 
 
Incentives for investors 
 For investors, going private transactions are interesting due to mainly 
two reasons. The first reason lies in abnormal returns, which are observed 
around the announcement of the transaction and can be earned by investors. 
The second reason is the bid premium paid to investors when one 
shareholder is purchasing the stakes to be able to accomplish the going 
private transaction. 
 Due to these two opportunities of earning large premiums in a short 
term compared to other investments, going private transactions are of special 
interest for investors. Following the assumption markets are semi-efficient, it 
is the incentive of every investor to recognize potential going private 
companies the earliest and the most precise possible. 
 Companies which might decide for a step into privacy are of interest 
for both small and large investors, because also the small ones are able to 
earn abnormal returns as well as bid premiums. Therefore, an investor tries 
to gain as much information as possible in order to recognize such 
companies with the highest certainty at the earliest possible point in time and 
overtake other investors. The earlier an investor can buy before rumors about 
a possible announcement of a going private transaction occur on the market, 
the better for him. 
 The incentive for large investors might be even bigger. Owning a 
larger stake of the company provides with a superior negotiating position, 
when selling block holdings. In addition to the regular bid premium paid to 
all investors, large shareholders might bargain a surplus. 
 Burnett (2012) is addressing the question about the sources of value 
in going private transactions. He finds a possible explanation in the transfer 
of wealth from other stakeholders to shareholders. According to him are ex-
ante bondholders adversely affected by a companies’ decision to delist from 
public capital market and they might lose out. After the going private step, a 
company might decide for riskier projects or e.g. to pay out higher dividends. 
This would change the situation of bondholders for the worse. 
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 Masulis et al. (2009) share a contrary opinion about the influence on 
bondholders after a going private transaction. They follow Jensen (1986) 
who observed reductions in agency costs after the step into privacy. 
According to them, this reduction can offset the worse situation of 
bondholders after a going private and then improve their position. The 
situation of shareholders is improved as well; they also profit from an agency 
costs reduction. 
 Consequently, companies which might decide for a step into privacy 
should receive a high attention from investors. If potential investors become 
shareholders before the announcement of such a transaction, they are not 
only able to earn abnormal returns, but also a bid premium. The larger their 
stake, the stronger is their negotiating power and accordingly, their 
possibility to increase their bid premium. Based on these facts, the major 
goal of research about going privates should focus on a precise 
characterization and subsequent recognition of such companies on the public 
capital market and so ease the decision making process of investors. 
 
Conclusion 
 The aim of this survey was to provide deeper insights about the going 
private decision of public companies. First, the question about the reasons 
and motives for the privacy phenomenon was addressed. A variety of 
different kind of incitements was presented and explained. Second, this paper 
was exploring chances for investors which occur on the capital market when 
the company they are invested in decides for a going private. Empirical 
papers were summarized which showed investors are not only able to profit 
from abnormal returns, but also may earn bid premiums when a company is 
buying its shares back. Third, this survey showed how to recognize potential 
going private companies on the public capital market. A large amount of 
previous empirical findings was analyzed and merged in a synopsis. Last, 
possible future research fields within the going private topic were presented 
and the need for further research was justified by presenting the specific 
investors’ incentives. 
 Companies’ considerations whether to go private or not were divided 
into three categories. Traditional considerations include high agency costs 
due to a large amount of free cash flow and different opinions of its use. Also 
liquidity, ownership and undervaluation considerations have postponed the 
going private decision. Recent motives include low visibility on the capital 
market, low growth opportunities as well as takeover considerations. Since 
the passage of SOA, regulatory considerations play also a significant role in 
the going private decision. 
 This survey is presenting results of all important empirical studies 
which were exploring the going private phenomenon from different point of 
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views. Also summarized is empirical evidence about abnormal returns 
occurring at the transaction announcement and about bid premiums which 
are offered to shareholders in order to make them sell their stakes. Further 
discussed are studies which allow potential investors to recognize potential 
going private companies. Companies characterized by e.g. small size, high 
free cash flow, with a major shareholder, low growth opportunities, low 
share liquidity or low analyst coverage are more likely to go private. 
 Only a few studies include the whole public lifecycle and not only the 
time shortly before the announcement of the going private transaction into 
their empirical analysis. In order to be able to identify potential going private 
companies even more precise, future research areas are seen within the 
lifecycle context as well as in identifying further attributes which might 
characterize these companies. An early recognition allows investors to earn 
high returns within a short period of time and on the opposite side it forces 
companies to always reconsider the value of their costly public-to-private-
and-back cycles. 
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